In this paper, Carolyn and Martin Needleman argue that scholars and the general public have a common understand that the Mexican political system is ultimately run by the president, with a central reliance on interest groups and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) while ignoring the voices of the local Mexican people. However, the authors write that many American scholars hold different interpretations on how governmental power is actually distributed throughout the Mexican government. The first is the that president is omnipotent, meaning that his power comes from “a personal charisma” and that there is a leadership group, the “Revolution Family,” composed of governmental elites that can influence decisions (1017). Second, is the view that the president relies completely on interest groups and the PRI to influence decisions, which results in political stagnation as they all attempt to compromise on their respective policy ideas. Third, the president’s power is at the extent of the bureaucracy and has been decentralized to the local level, eliminating the PRI’s and president’s role in decision making. Lastly, some believe that the president acts as an administrator and works closely with the bureaucracy. After discussing the four view, the authors question and evaluate how the president can supervise the bureaucracy, can respond to the demands of interest groups, and allow the PRI to work hand-in-hand in policy formulation. Although I appreciated how the authors clearly divided the four point of views and shared quotes from authors defending each point, I would have liked to see more empirical data and real-world examples showing how presidents have acted in one or more of these classifications. However, I ultimately agree with the theme of the paper which is that in order to help advance the Mexican political process and governmental capability/efficiency, there needs to be a better understanding on how power dynamics work within the government.